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I Comments I
Inspection and Investigation of Public
Accounting Firms Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: Real Reform?
Jeremy S. Blocher*
I. Introduction
On July 30, 2002, President George Bush signed into law the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("the Act"),1 the most significant reform of the
oversight of the accounting profession in recent years. The Act was a
direct response by Congress to the wave of recent corporate bankruptcies
and related audit failures, including the Enron debacle.2 One of the most
significant provisions of the Act created a new regulatory body, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), to oversee
the audit of public companies subject to the securities laws, to protect the
interests of investors, and to promote preparation of accurate and
* Certified Public Accountant, State of Washington. J.D. Candidate, The
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, 2006; B.A. Western
Washington University, 1999.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.).
2. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 1-2 (2002).
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independent audit reports.3
Prior to the Act, the accounting profession had been primarily self-
regulated.4 Congress vested the new PCAOB with broad power to
perform inspections and investigations of the conduct of accounting
firms that audit financial statements of companies issuing publicly traded
securities.5 Congress also vested the PCAOB with the power to
discipline these accounting firms.
6
This comment analyzes the provisions of the Act that grant the
PCAOB its powers of inspection and investigation, as well as the rules
promulgated by the PCAOB to implement those provisions. It also
analyzes whether these rules will be effective in accomplishing the
objectives of the Act, specifically to improve the accountability of the
accounting profession and promote investor confidence. Section II-A
provides background on the recent impetus behind the passage of the
Act, including the Enron debacle. Section II-B discusses the importance
of the independence of the auditor in a financial audit. Section II-C
describes the scheme of regulatory oversight that was in existence prior
to the Act. Section II-D provides an overview of the Act and its relevant
provisions, as well as the rules promulgated by the PCAOB to implement
those provisions. Section III then analyzes whether the scheme of
inspection and investigation established under the Act and PCAOB rules
will create meaningful reform in furtherance of the objectives of the Act
by bringing more accountability to the accounting profession. Section
IV discusses important questions left unanswered after the passage of the
Act and promulgation of the PCAOB rules, regarding the effectiveness
of the implementation of the Act by the PCAOB. Finally, Section V
concludes by maintaining that the Act will result in meaningful reform
that, overall, should accomplish the objectives of the Act, but will also
leave some important unanswered questions.
II. Background
A. Enron
The collapse of Enron, once among the top ten of the Fortune 500
with a stock market value of over $60 billion,7 sent shock waves through
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 10 1(a).
4. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Volume II, 107th Cong. 552 (2002) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings 11] (statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of the U.S.).
5. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 104-105.
6. Id. § 104(c).
7. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Volume I, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter
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the U.S. capital markets. On November 8, 2001, the energy giant
announced it had overstated earnings by $586 million since 1997.8
Ultimately, the restatements to Enron's financial statements resulted in a
net income reduction of $1.5 billion and a reduction in shareholder
equity of over $2 billion.9 On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' 0
At the center of attention was Arthur Andersen ("Andersen"),
Enron's independent auditor. While responsible for the external audit of
Enron, Andersen was also responsible for the internal audits of Enron,
and many of Enron's internal staff were former Andersen executives. 1
Andersen had issued unqualified opinions on Enron's financial
statements from 1997 through 2000,12 and, as a result of the Enron
announcements, Andersen's independence was called into question.'
3
Andersen was largely involved in Enron's financial decisions, as
evidenced by the fees received for non-audit services. 14  In 2001,
Andersen received $27 million in non-audit service fees and $25 million
in audit service fees from Enron.
15
Andersen was later convicted by a Texas jury for obstruction of
justice for its role in the destruction of Enron related documents, a
conviction upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 16 Andersen had
already settled with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in
2001 for its role in issuing materially false and misleading financial
statements for Waste Management, Inc. for the years 1992 through
1996.17 Despite the fact that Waste Management's earnings during that
period had been overstated by more than $1 billion, Andersen had issued
unqualified "clean" audit opinions each year.18
B. The Importance ofAuditor Independence
The independent audit has played an important part in the financial
Senate Hearings 1] (statement of Paul Sarbanes, Committee Chairman).
8. Id.
9. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FIN. 9, 16 (2002).
10. Id.
11. C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall ofEnron, J. ACCT., Apr. 2002, at 41.
12. Sally S. Spielvogel, Exploring the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Will Government
Intervention in the Public Accounting Profession Prevent Another Enron?, 92 Ky. L.J.
339, 341 (2003).
13. Thomas, supra note 11, at 41.
14. Spielvogel, supra note 12, at 343.
15. Mark. A. Worden, Securities Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence from
Non-Audit Services-An Evolving Standard, 55 OKLA. L. REv. 513, 521 (2002).
16. U.S. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP., 374 F.3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004).
17. Worden, supra note 15, at 519-20.
18. Id.
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reporting process that facilitates investor confidence in the capital
markets. 19 Investor confidence begins with the quality of financial
information available to help investors make their investment decisions.
20
This confidence depends on the public's trust that auditors are free from
conflicts of interest with the companies they audit.2' It is the expectation
of the investing public that auditors will exercise their duty objectively to
prevent the issuance of misleading financial statements.22
The Enron collapse raised questions about the ability of the auditor
to remain truly independent.23 Auditing standards require that the auditor
maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters relating to the
assignment24 and that independence be maintained both in fact and in
appearance.25 The standards explicitly recognize the importance of
independence in ensuring the confidence of the public in the profession.26
Auditor independence is compromised in many ways. When fees
received by the auditor for non-audit consulting services are much larger
than fees received for the audit itself, the incentive to overlook audit
issues is intensified. 27 Another concern has been the so-called "revolving
door," describing the crossover in employment between the auditor and
the client.28 Also of concern is the risk that when an auditor serves a
client for a long period of time, the auditor becomes too close with the
client.29 However, perhaps the simple fact that the client pays the auditor
for the audit, and has the power to fire the auditor, is the most significant
threat to auditor independence.30 In the past, even though the incentives
for violating the profession's independence standards were great,
auditors had little fear of sanctions if they violated them.3'
19. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 557 (statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the U.S.).
20. Id. at 1105 (statement of Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
21. Id. at 557 (statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of the U.S.).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 558.
24. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1, § 220.01 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
25. Id. § 220.03.
26. Id.
27. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 558 (statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the U.S.).
28. Id. at 559.
29. Id.
30. See Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 1033 (statement of Howard
Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer Federation of America Chairman).
31. Id. at 1034.
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C. Pre-Act Scheme of Regulation
Prior to the Act, the accounting profession had been allowed by the
SEC to operate in an environment of self-regulation.32 While State
boards of accountancy would license firms to practice public
accounting,33 the profession regulated itself through a myriad of Self-
Regulatory Organizations ("SROs"), 34  some with overlapping
responsibilities. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") has administered the self-regulatory system for the
accounting profession, including setting auditing and independence
standards, monitoring compliance, and disciplining members for rules
violations.35
The Public Oversight Board ("POB"), established by the AICPA,
monitored public accounting firms' compliance with professional
standards.36  Additionally, AICPA members who audited public
companies were required to join the AICPA's Securities and Exchange
Commission Practice Section ("SECPS").37 The Quality Control Inquiry
Committee of the SECPS ("QCIC") was charged with investigating audit
failures arising from litigation or regulatory investigations, and the
Professional Ethics Executive Committee of the AICPA ("PEEC") was
charged with responsibility for discipline.38
Auditing standards require that a firm develop a system of quality
control in conducting an auditing practice,39 and the AICPA has also
required that members of a public accounting firm engaged in public
32. See Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 552 (statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the U.S.).
33. Id.
34. Id. SROs are groups of industry professionals with quasi-governmental powers
to adopt and enforce standards of conduct for their members. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 552. The POB oversaw the peer review system established to monitor
compliance of accounting firms with professional standards. Id. at 556. The POB also
oversaw the Accounting Standards Board, one of the multiple standard setting bodies. Id.
The POB had five public members and received its funding from the AICPA. Id.
37. Spielvogel, supra note 12, at 347.
38. Senate Hearings I, supra note 4, at 799 (statement of Bevis Longstreth, Member
of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
39. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 4, § 161.02 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1979).
A system of quality control is designed to provide a firm with reasonable assurance that
its personnel comply with generally accepted auditing standards. Id. Generally accepted
auditing standards relate to the conduct on individual audits, while quality control
standards relate to the firm's conduct as a whole. Id. § 161.03. Deficiencies in, or
noncompliance with, a firm's quality control system do not, in and of themselves,
indicate that a particular audit was not performed in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. Id.
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practice be enrolled in an approved practice monitoring system, such as
the AICPA peer review program.40 The Financial Accounting Standards
Board and the Auditing Standards Board have been responsible for
setting accounting and auditing standards for the profession, while
auditor independence rules have been set by the AICPA, SEC, and the
U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO").4'
The 2000 Panel on Audit Effectiveness 42 found that the regulatory
system lacked sufficient public representation, suffered from ineffective
communication between entities and divergent views as to the
profession's priorities, and did not have a timely or effective disciplinary
system.43 It was questioned whether the system of peer review produced
anything more than "mutual back scratching,"" and concerns about the
effectiveness of the POB were confirmed when the Board chose to
voluntarily terminate itself.45 In addition to the organizational concerns,
there were real concerns about the desire of the profession to have an
effective system of self-regulation, as opposed to the mere appearance of
such a system.46
D. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and PCAOB Rules
After the fall of Enron and the ensuing collapse of Arthur Andersen,
Congress quickly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.4' The Act
was intended to improve quality and transparency in financial reporting
and independent audits for public companies, to strengthen auditor
independence, and to strengthen oversight of the accounting profession.48
40. Anita Dennis, A Refresher Course in Peer Review, J. ACCT., Feb. 1997, at 72.
Peer reviews are reviews of a firm's quality control system performed by members of
another firm. Id.
41. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 555 (statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the U.S.).
42. The Panel was appointed in 1998 by the POB at the request of the SEC. Id. at
717 (statement of Shaun O'Malley, Chairman, Panel on Audit Effectiveness). The Panel
included leaders in the audit profession, two former SEC Commissioners, and a staff of
experienced auditors. Id. The Panel conducted a detailed study of the audit
effectiveness, the impact of non-audit services on auditor independence, and the
adequacy of the auditing profession's current governance system. Id.
43. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 5 (2002).
44. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 897 (statement of Charles Bowsher,
Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
45. In 2002, the POB decided to dissolve itself because the Board felt it could no
longer effectively fulfill its mission under the existing system of regulation. See id. at
793 (statement of Bevis Longstreth, Member of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Former
Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
46. Id. at 799.
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.).
48. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 1 (2002).
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The Act created the PCAOB to oversee the profession and bring together
various responsibilities that had, in the past, been spread amongst many
different monitoring organizations. 49 The PCAOB is comprised of five
members who have demonstrated commitment to the interests of the
investing public, only two of which are permitted to have been CPAs.5°
Under the Act, accounting firms that audit companies with publicly
traded securities are required to register with the PCAOB. 51 The Act
states that the PCAOB shall perform regular inspections of registered
firmS. 52  The Act also gives the PCAOB the power to perform
investigations of acts or practices that may constitute rules violations. 3
The PCAOB must perform annual inspections of those registered
firms that provide audits for more than 100 "issuers,, 54 and at least
triennial inspections of all other registered firms.55 The PCAOB is
charged with identifying any act, practice, or omission, by the firm or
any associated person, that may violate the Act, the rules of the Board,
the rules of the SEC, the firm's own quality control policies, or
professional standards.56 The Act then gives the PCAOB the authority to
report any such wrongdoing to the SEC and State regulatory authorities,
begin a formal investigation, or take disciplinary action.57
The Act gives the PCAOB the authority to investigate any act,
practice, or omission, by a firm or any associated person, that may
violate the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the SEC, or
professional standards.5 8 In conducting investigations, the PCAOB may
require testimony of the firm or of any associated person, require the
production of work papers or other documents, and seek issuance of an
SEC subpoena to require production of testimony or documents.59 The
Act also provides that all documents and information related to PCAOB
investigations shall be confidential and privileged.60 If the Board finds a
49. Id. at 4-5.
50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(l)-(2).
51. Id. § 102(a).
52. Id. § 104(a).
53. Id. § 105(b)(1).
54. The term "issuer" means an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c)), the securities of which are registered
under section 12 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or that files or has filed a registration
statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn.
Id. § 2(a)(7).
55. Id. § 104(b)(1).
56. Id. § 104(c)(1).
57. Id. § 104(c)(2).
58. Id. § 105(b)(l).
59. Id. § 105(b)(1)(A)-(B), (D).
60. Id. § 105(b)(5)(A).
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violation of the aforementioned rules, it is empowered to impose
sanctions ranging from revocation of a firm's registration to imposition
of monetary penalties.
61
The Act requires that the PCAOB establish rules to implement the
provisions of the Act that grant the Board its powers of inspection and
investigation.62 After subjecting its draft rules to a comment process, the
PCAOB promulgated its final rules for inspections
63 and investigations. 64
These rules were intended to implement the full authority given to the
PCAOB and provide the PCAOB with flexibility in its administration of
the relevant provisions of the Act. While the rules broadly implement
sections 104 and 105 of the Act and should allow the PCAOB to
implement an effective scheme of inspection and investigation, as
discussed in the following section of this comment, they also leave some
important unanswered questions that will be discussed in Section IV of
this comment.
III. Analysis of the Act and PCAOB Rules
As mentioned in Parts I and II, the Act was intended to promote
independence in the audit process and strengthen oversight of the
accounting profession through the creation of the PCAOB.65 The powers
of inspection, investigation, and discipline granted to the PCAOB under
sections 104 and 105 of the Act will be critical to accomplishing that
objective. This section is divided into subsections based on various
points of comparison between the prior scheme of inspection and
investigation and the scheme of inspection and investigation created by
the Act. This section of the comment compares the prior scheme to the
planned scheme under the Act and will discuss whether this new model
will result in real improvement over the previous model.
A. Independence and Funding
Prior to the passage of the Act, the mechanism of inspection of the
major accounting firms was fragmented, the most significant inspection
61. Id. § 105(c)(4)(A)-(G).
62. Id. §§ 104(c), 105(a).
63. Inspection of Registered Public Accounting Firms, 69 Fed. Reg. 22103
(proposed Apr. 23, 2004) (approved by the SEC on June 7, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 31850),
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules of theBoard/Section_4.pdf
[hereinafter PCAOB Inspection Rules].
64. Investigations and Adjudications, 69 Fed. Reg. 15394 (proposed Mar. 25, 2004)
(approved by the SEC on May 20, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 29150), available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules of theBoard/Section_5.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB
Investigation Rules].
65. See supra notes 3, 48 and accompanying text.
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programs being the AICPA peer review program, investigations by the
POB, and investigations of alleged audit failures by the QCIC.6 6 While
there were multiple organizations responsible for some form of
inspection, none of these organizations were truly independent of the
profession. As a result, the power of each of the organizations, and
thereby the effectiveness of each of the organizations, was hampered by
the very firms they were charged with investigating.
The POB was created in 1977 to oversee the self-regulation of the
profession. 67 Although the Board consisted of five members who were
not tied to the profession,68 the Board was funded by voluntary dues paid
by SECPS members. 69 As such, the members of the SECPS, including
the major accounting firms, essentially controlled the success or failure
of the POB. On May 3, 2000, the SECPS informed the POB that it
would not fund special reviews of public accounting firms, which had
been sought in order to determine if the firms had complied with SEC
and professional independence standards. 70 After further delay tactics by
the Big Five, the largest public accounting firms, the reviews were never
conducted.71
The Board felt that an independent charter would aid in its
independence, and the process of creating one was delayed by the
members of the Big Five.72 After the new charter was finally allowed,
the members insisted on a funding cap for the POB.7 3 In addition, the
POB lacked the ability to organize and implement its own quality control
reviews of firms.7 4 In at least one case where the POB did attempt to
investigate possible stock-ownership violations at the major firms,
funding was refused and the investigation went nowhere. 75 As a result of
its inability to fulfill its duties due to its inherent limitations, the POB
disbanded.76
66. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
67. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 939 (statement of Charles Bowsher,
Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
68. Senate Hearings L supra note 7, at 71 (statement of David Ruder, Former
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
69. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 1117 (statement of Harvey Pitt, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission).




74. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 1117 (statement of Harvey Pitt, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission).
75. Id. at 1035 (statement of Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer
Federation of America).
76. See id. at 941 (statement of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight
Board).
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The other significant mechanism of inspection has been the AICPA
peer review system. However, the independence of the system is
inherently flawed, in that the process has been overseen by the SECPS,
77
and the firm being reviewed is involved in deciding which outside firm
will perform the peer review. 78 A system of "mutual back-scratching"
79
was developed, whereby the review of one accounting firm by another
did not result in any real discipline.8° One fact which is very telling
about the overall effectiveness of the peer review system was that despite
the fact that all of the major firms had continuously undergone peer
review, no Big Five firm, including Arthur Anderson, ever failed a peer
review.81
Just as auditing standards require the auditor to be independent in
fact and appearance, a system of oversight and inspection of accounting
firms should require the same. The inspection scheme under the PCAOB
goes a long way toward creating such independence and remedying some
of the most significant limitations of the previous system of self-
regulation. The Board is comprised of five members, who may not be
involved with any other business activity, or share in the profits of any
public accounting firm, while serving on the Board.82 The members
must also have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors
and the public.83  These requirements will help to promote an
"appearance" of independence.
Independence "in fact" will be strengthened by the establishment of
an independent funding source for the PCAOB. The Act prescribes an
accounting support fee payable by issuers, with the amount charged to
each issuer based on equity market capitalization, to fund PCAOB
operations.84 This provision of the Act places the responsibility for
funding the oversight of public accounting firms squarely on the
shoulders of the direct users of accounting services, the issuers. This
reduces the power and influence previously exercised by the major
accounting firms to stave off inspections and investigations and postpone
77. Id. at 940 (statement of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
78. Dennis, supra note 40, at 72.
79. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 940 (statement of Charles Bowsher,
Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
80. See The Enron Collapse: Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 48
(2002) (statement of Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
81. Nanette Byrnes, Mike McNamee, Diane Brady, Louis Lavelle & Christopher
Palmeri, Accounting in Crisis, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 28, 2002, at 44.
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(e)(3), 116 Stat. 745,
751 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(e)(3)).
83. Id. § 101(e)(1).
84. Id. § 109(g).
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discipline, by pulling on the funding strings of the regulatory
organization.
The establishment of an adequate independent funding source has
given the PCAOB the opportunity to operate free from the influence of
the major accounting firms when setting its policy objectives and in its
rulemaking process. The Act allows the PCAOB to set its budget, with
SEC approval, and collect from issuers the support fees necessary to fund
its operations." Independent funding allows the PCAOB to set its
inspection and investigation protocols without the burden of wondering
if those subject to investigation will fund them. Independent funding
also gives the PCAOB the opportunity to attract qualified investigation
and enforcement staff to more effectively fulfill its obligation to
investors.86
In summary, the independent nature of the PCAOB gives the Board
enhanced ability to detect and deal with deficiencies in the quality
control systems of accounting firms. The Board will also be better able
to respond to individual acts of noncompliance. It also appears that the
Board will be able to operate free of the monetary influence of the major
accounting firms, which in the past has limited the scope of investigatory
powers of the profession's regulatory bodies.
B. Scope of Investigatory Powers
Prior to the Act, the QCIC was charged with investigating alleged
audit failures arising from regulatory investigation or from litigation.87
However, these reviews were limited to identifying deficiencies in the
firm's system of quality control, as opposed to identifying specific
instances of fraud or wrongdoing.88 The PEEC would then take cases on
referral from the QCIC for potential individual discipline, but it would
defer any investigation until litigation or other regulatory action was
complete.89  Thus, the firm's interests in deferring any further
investigation and prevailing in litigation were prioritized over the
interests of investors in obtaining accountability and transparency.
As with PEEC review, peer reviews did not focus on audits that
were the subject of litigation or regulatory investigation,9" deferring to
the firm's interest in postponing any further inspection. Additionally, as
85. Id. § 109(b), (d).
86. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 1036 (statement of Howard M.
Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer Federation of America).
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf
A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 942 (statement of Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
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with QCIC review, peer review only focused on the quality control
system of the firm being reviewed, not the audit work performed on
specific engagements to determine if a different conclusion would have
been reached.91
As the PCAOB has the authority to perform inspections much
broader in scope than that of a QCIC inspection or peer review, the
PCAOB should be much more effective in maintaining accountability in
the profession. Specifically included within the scope of authority of the
PCAOB under the Act are audit engagements that are the subject of
ongoing litigation.92 As these engagements represent potential "problem
audits," review of these engagements should give the PCAOB the
opportunity to review the quality control system of the firm, determine in
a timely manner what went wrong, and help to avoid future audit
failures.
While the PCAOB is charged with evaluating a firm's system of
quality control, as were the QCIC and peer reviewers, the PCAOB is also
expressly charged with reviewing specific audit engagements to identify
specific acts of fraud or other noncompliance with the Act, PCAOB
rules, SEC rules, or professional standards, 93 even if they do not
represent a weakness in the firm's overall system of quality control. This
should allow the PCAOB to accomplish more completely its objective of
protecting investor interests, instead of simply the interests of the
accounting firms. Where in the past, individual instances of misconduct
noted during a review of a firm's quality control system were referred to
a separate regulatory body for resolution, the PCAOB can now respond
timely to these individual instances of misconduct that arise from a
review of a firm's quality control system, as well as the overall quality
control issues. The PCAOB has implemented the full extent of its
authority under the Act in adopting its rules on inspections and
investigations, 94 maintaining flexibility and a broad scope of authority
91. Senate Hearings I, supra note 7, at 76 (statement of Harold M. Williams, Former
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
92. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 104(d)(1), 116 Stat. 745,
758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7214(d)(1)).
93. Id. §§ 104(c)(1), 105(b)(1).
94. "In performing a regular inspection, the staff... shall take such steps, and
perform such procedures, as the Board determines are necessary and appropriate."
PCAOB Inspection Rules, supra note 63, Rule 4001.
The Director of Enforcement and Investigations may undertake an informal
inquiry where it appears that, or to determine whether, an act or practice, or
omission to act ... may violate--(1) any provision of the Act; (2) the Rules of
the Board; (3) the provisions of the securities laws relating to the preparation
and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants
with respect thereto. . .; or (4) professional standards.
PCAOB Investigation Rules, supra note 64, Rule 5100(a).
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for itself. This should result in more timely remediation, as well as more
effective disclosure to investors.
C. Access to Information
To facilitate a broad scope of investigative authority, broad access
to information is needed by the investigative body. In the past, a lack of
adequate investigative authority has limited the effectiveness of the
regulatory organizations charged with inspection of accounting firms.
While the QCIC and POB were able to conduct investigations of
accounting firms, they were unable to subpoena records or testimony as
part of those investigations. 95 This meant that these organizations were
limited to the public record in building a case against a firm or
individual. In situations where the SEC launched a regulatory
investigation against a party and settled the matter subject to
confidentiality, the QCIC and POB did not have access to that
information for purposes of their own investigation and disciplinary
action.96 In conducting their investigations these regulatory bodies could
not guarantee access to the audit work papers and firm personnel
involved in a specific audit engagement, and they could not require the
audit client to communication with them.
97
In contrast, the Act gives the PCAOB broad access to information in
the course of an investigation. The Act allows the PCAOB to require the
testimony of the firm under investigation, or any person associated with
that firm, dealing with "any matter that the Board considers relevant or
material" in the course of an investigation.9 8 Noncooperation with a
PCAOB investigation can result in a person being suspended or barred
from association with a registered public accounting firm, or revocation
of the firm's registration.99 Additionally, as the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has been held by courts to be
[T]he Board may issue an order of formal investigation when it appears that an
act or practice, or omission to act, by a registered public accounting firm or any
person associated with a registered public accounting firm may violate any
provision of the Act, the Rules of the Board, the provisions of the securities
laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations
and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto . . ., or professional standards.
Id. Rule 5101(a)(1).
95. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 1035 (statement of Howard Metzenbaum,
Chairman, Consumer Federation of America Chairman).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 981 (The Road to Reform, A White Paper from the Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a New Private Sector Regulatory Structure for the Accounting
Profession, March 19, 2002).
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(1)(A).
99. Id. § 105(b)(3)(A).
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inapplicable within the context of a regulatory investigation by an
SRO, 100 true cooperation with such an investigation is required for a
person to remain able to practice in the industry. 0 1 As a practical matter,
this helps to ensure the PCAOB will truly be given the access to
information that the Act provides.
The Act further gives the PCAOB access to any other document or
information in the hands of the firm that the Board deems relevant or
material, including the audit work papers. 10 2 In addition to the broad
powers given to the Board to compel production by the accounting firm
under investigation, the PCAOB is also given broad authority to compel
production of testimony and documents of audit clients, or any other
person, when deemed relevant or material to the investigation.'0 3 This
power is strengthened by the authority of the PCAOB to seek an SEC
subpoena to compel production of testimony or documents from any
person.1°4
The PCAOB developed its rules to implement the full authority of
the Act. During the rulemaking process, comments were submitted by
accounting firms that encouraged the imposition of limits on the access
to information by PCAOB investigators. One commentator, concerned
about "fishing expeditions," recommended the imposition of a
"reasonableness" standard with regard to the Board's authority to compel
testimony. 0 5  The Board declined to impose such a standard. 0 6  In
response to a comment received during the rulemaking process that the
rules should require PCAOB investigators to begin their informational
inquiries as narrowly as possible, the Board responded that this
comment, as others that were made, seem premised on the assumption
that the investigators would not act reasonably unless the Board rules
expressly required them to do so, a proposition that the Board expressly
100. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 800 (statement of Bevis Longstreth, Member
of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
101. The Board has stated that it does not intend to invade a privilege that would be a
valid basis for resisting an SEC subpoena, including valid assertions of the privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Rules on Investigations and
Adjudications, PCAOB Release No. 2003-015 app. 2 at A2-33, at
http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_005/Release2003-015.pdf (Sep. 29, 2003)
[hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2003-015]. However, the Board also stated that such an
assertion may be used as evidence in Board disciplinary proceedings and will result in
evidentiary inferences against the person asserting the privilege. Id. The Board may also
report assertions of that privilege to other appropriate authorities, as permitted under the
Act. Id.
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(1)(B).
103. Id. § 105(b)(1)(C).
104. Id. § 105(b)(1)(D).
105. PCAOB Release No. 2003-015, supra note 101, app. 2 at A2-15.
106. Id.
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denied. 10 7 Thus, it appears the Board fully intends to reserve for itself as
much flexibility as possible in its investigation and inspection processes
as is allowed by the Act.
The broad authority of the PCAOB to access the otherwise private
information of the accounting firms under investigation, as well as that of
other relevant parties, should lead to the timely completion of regulatory
investigations. This access should also give the Board the ability to
follow through with investigations that in the past would not have been
possible because of a lack of access to the appropriate documents and
testimony. This authority will greatly improve the effectiveness of the
investigation process and should help lead to more timely and relevant
disclosure to investors of accounting firm malfeasance.
To facilitate thorough inspection, the PCAOB is also empowered to
develop record retention standards to be followed by public accounting
firms, in addition to those already specified in the Act.'0 8 This further
ensures that the PCAOB will have access to needed documents.
However, this access is contingent on the PCAOB proceeding to enact
further standards on record retention. 0 9 The Board expressly deferred
this privilege in its rulemaking process, intending to develop these
standards once the Board gains experience with the inspection process."1 0
D. Confidentiality
An important element of an effective scheme of regulatory
investigation is the ability of the investigator to provide privileged and
confidential status for information that is part of the investigation. This
confidentiality and privilege helps to encourage cooperation with the
investigatory process by the firms under investigation. The regulatory
organizations prior to the Act had no authority to provide such privilege
and confidentiality for information that was part of an investigation."'
The POB attempted to enter into confidentiality agreements with the
major accounting firms in 2001, with no success. 12 As a result, these
107. Id. app 2. at A2-11.
108. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(e). The Act specifies that each registered accounting
firm must maintain, for not less than seven years, audit work papers, and other
information related to any audit report, sufficient to support the conclusions reached in
the audit report. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i).
109. Id. § 104(e).
110. Inspection of Registered Accounting Firms, PCAOB Release No. 2003-019 app.
2 at A2-13, at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_006/Release2003-019.pdf (Oct. 7,
2003) [hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2003-019].
111. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 942 (statement of Charles Bowsher,
Chairman, Public Oversight Board).
112. Id. at 983 (The Road to Reform, A White Paper from the Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a New Private Sector Regulatory Structure for the Accounting
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processes were hindered by a lack of trust and by concern about the lack
of confidentiality." 13  Firms, therefore, were not willing to disclose
information that was likely to end up in the hands of litigants in a legal
proceeding."14 This was a significant barrier to the access to information
by regulatory bodies in the past.
The Act grants confidential and privileged status to documents and
information that are part of a PCAOB inspection under section 104 of the
Act, or an investigation under section 105 of the Act." 5 The Act
provides that all documents and information prepared or received by, or
specifically for, the Board, in connection with an inspection under
section 104 or an investigation under section 105, are confidential and
privileged.116 This privilege exempts the information from discovery in a
legal proceeding, and also from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act." 7 The ability to grant such confidentiality may help to
encourage cooperation with PCAOB inspections and investigations to a
degree not evidenced in the past.
With the PCAOB's broad access to information, arises the question
of how information falling under traditional common law or statutory
privileges will be treated. The Board has expressly stated that it does not
intend to recognize any assertion of a state-recognized "accountant-
client" privilege in conducting its inspections. 1 8 The Board has drawn
the line for when a privilege will be honored, in the face of a PCAOB
demand for information, at any privilege that would be a valid basis for
resisting an SEC subpoena under prevailing law." 9 Beyond that, all
other privileges are, in the Board's view, preempted by the Act. 20
Despite the confidential and privileged status given to information
that is part of a PCAOB inspection or investigation, such confidential
information can still be released at the close of the investigation in a
public proceeding, or as part of disciplinary proceedings.' 2' The Act also
gives the PCAOB the authority to make the information available to the
SEC, the Attorney General of the U.S., the appropriate Federal functional
Profession, March 19, 2002).
113. Id. at 724 (statement of Shaun O'Malley, Chairman, Panel on Audit
Effectiveness).
114. Id. at 987 (The Road to Reform, A White Paper from the Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a New Private Sector Regulatory Structure for the Accounting
Profession, March 19, 2002).
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 105(b)(5)(A), 116 Stat.
745, 761 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(B)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. PCA OB Release No. 2003-019, supra note 110, app. 2 at A2-16.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(5)(A).
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regulator, 22 State attorneys general, and appropriate State regulatory
authorities. 23  The information stills retains its confidential and
privileged status upon being turned over to any of the above agencies,
and the recipient agency has the responsibility to maintain the
information as confidential and privileged.
124
As the PCAOB has seemingly broad authority to disclose
information of its own volition to many different outside agencies, the
cooperation hoped for may not materialize. If the accounting firms fear
that the information may be turned over to an outside agency that would
seek to use it for purposes outside the scope of the PCAOB investigation,
they may be reluctant to provide the information to the PCAOB. The
PCAOB may have to fall back on its broad authority to compel testimony
and document production in order to be provided with the information it
seeks to further its investigations.
In addition, the PCAOB, in its rulemaking process, interpreted its
authority to disclose information even more broadly. The rules enacted
by the Board state that the Board is not prohibited from disclosing any
documents, testimony, or other information to any other person as is
reasonably necessary to carry out the Board's responsibility, under
section 105 of the Act, to conduct investigations according to fair
procedures. 125  This rule applies only to Board investigations under
section 105 and not to inspections by the Board under section 104 of the
Act. The Board has stated that it interprets section 105(b)(5)(A) of the
Act, in light of, rather than in isolation from, the rest of section 105 of
the Act, which begins by authorizing the Board to conduct investigations
according to fair procedures. 126 In its interpretation of the Act, the Board
has limited the application of the rule to the disclosure of information to
a person from whom the Board demands or requests information in
connection with an investigation, 127 and to only those cases where such
disclosure is reasonably necessary to carry out legitimate investigative
functions fairly.'
28
This broad interpretation by the Board has raised concerns by the
major accounting firms about whether the Board is attempting to exceed
122. As defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809). Id.
§ 105(b)(5)(B)(ii)(II).
123. Id. § 105(b)(5)(B).
124. Id.
125. PCAOB Investigation Rules, supra note 64, Rule 5108.
126. PCAOB Release No. 2003-015, supra note 101, app. 2 at A2-38.
127. For example, the Board purports to have the authority to show a witness, in an
enforcement action, documents provided during the investigation by someone other than
the witness. Id.
128. Id. app. 2 at A2-38 to -39.
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its authority under the Act. 129 Section 105(b)(5)(B) of the Act expressly
lists agencies to whom the confidential and privileged information may
be made available. 130 The accounting firms have a strong argument that
the authority of the PCAOB to disclose confidential and privileged
information is expressly limited by the Act to the agencies specifically
listed in section 105(b)(5)(B). However, it does not appear that the
PCAOB intends to invoke their purportedly broad disclosure authority
except in very limited circumstances. 3 ' As such, it remains to be seen
whether this will be an issue of serious contention in the future.
E. Transparency
While there are advantages to the investigatory process in keeping
certain information confidential, as discussed above, one of the primary
objectives of the Act was to make the results of regulatory investigations
and disciplinary proceedings more transparent to the investing public.
132
Transparency in the regulatory process is necessary to provide assurance
to the investing public that the process is working and that wrongdoing is
being handled with real discipline. The peer review process has not been
a transparent system of accounting firm inspection, as the results of peer
reviews are not made public. 133 The same has been generally true in the
past of disciplinary proceedings by other regulatory bodies. 134 The result
has been the virtual exclusion of the investing public from the
disciplinary process.
The Act contains provisions for making the results of PCAOB
inspections available to the public. The Act states that once an
inspection of a firm is complete, and the firm has responded to a draft
inspection report, the final report shall be transmitted to the SEC and to
appropriate State regulatory authorities and also made available to the
public.' 35 The copy of the report made available to the public is made
available subject to the confidentiality and privilege provisions of section
105(b)(5)(A) of the Act. 3 6 Additionally, no portions of the report that
129. See All Comments to Date on the Proposed Rules on Inspections of Registered
Public Accounting Firms, Comment of Ernst & Young LLP 2, Comment of KMPG LLP
2-3, PCAOB Release No. 2003-013, at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_006/
Comments/All.pdf (July 28, 2003).
130. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
132. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 1 (2002).
133. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 986. (The Road to Reform, A White Paper
from the Public Oversight Board On Legislation to Create a New Private Sector
Regulatory Structure for the Accounting Profession, March 19, 2002).
134. Id. at 981.
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(g)(1)-(2).
136. Id. § 104(g)(2).
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deal with criticisms of, or potential defects in, the quality control systems
of the firm under inspection are made public if they are remedied within
twelve months of the report date.
137
While the inspection reports of the PCAOB are made available to
the public, it is unlikely that complete information about deficiencies
noted will be made available in a timely manner. While information
regarding isolated deficiencies would presumably be disclosed upon the
close of the investigation, the firms have twelve months to remedy
systemic deficiencies.' 38 In addition, if the firms disagree as to the
conclusions in a final inspection report, or as to whether systemic
deficiencies have been adequately resolved, they can seek review by the
SEC. 139 This process could postpone the final reporting of investigation
results, or even prohibit their disclosure, depending on the judgment of
the SEC. As a result, it remains to be seen whether the reporting system
established under the Act will truly lead to timely public disclosure and
result in the true transparency of the inspection process.
The PCAOB appears to have anticipated this issue. In its rules, the
Board included a provision that, notwithstanding the twelve-month
period given for remediation and the ability of a firm to seek SEC
review, permits the Board to publish summaries, compilations, or other
general reports concerning the procedures, findings, and results of its
various inspections.1 40 These reports can include discussion of criticisms
of, or potential defects in, the quality control systems of any firm subject
to inspection, but cannot identify to which firm the criticisms apply until
that information is released in accordance with the above provisions of
the Act. 4 1 The purpose of these reports is to alert the investing public to
general information that otherwise would not yet be available.
42
It is unclear where the Board finds its statutory authority to issue
these general reports by simply omitting the name of the firm at issue.
As part of such reports, the Board would likely disclose information
appearing in draft inspection reports, which the Board itself
acknowledged are confidential under section 105(b)(5)(A) of the Act, as
prepared in connection with a section 104 inspection. 43 Information
appearing in other such documents covered by section 105(b)(5)(A) of
the Act would also likely be discussed in such reports. The Board
appears to be actively asserting its responsibility to ensure that
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 104(h)(1).
140. PCAOB Inspection Rules, supra note 63, Rule 4010.
141. Id.
142. PCAOB Release No. 2003-019, supra note 110, app. 2 at A2-34 to -35.
143. Id. app. 2 at A2-18.
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information is made available to the public in a timely manner, but it
remains to be seen if the statutory authority of the Board to do so will be
challenged.
The Board is also charged with public disclosure when the results of
an investigation result in a finding of wrongdoing. Under the Act, the
Board may refer an investigation to the SEC, any other federal functional
regulator, 144 or, at the direction of the SEC, the Board may refer an
investigation to the Attorney General of the U.S., State attorneys general,
or an appropriate State regulatory authority. 145 The Act also requires the
Board to report sanctions imposed as a result of an investigation to the
SEC, State regulatory authorities, and the public. 146  The disclosure
includes the name of the sanctioned person, a description of and the basis
for the sanction, and other information as deemed appropriate by the
Board.1 47  While final sanctions are made public, the investigation
process itself is nonpublic, and disciplinary hearings may only be public
with the consent of the parties involved. 1
48
While there are some complicating matters, as discussed above, the
PCAOB has been charged with disclosing to the public the results of its
inspections and investigations. As discussed above, the Board appears to
be taking an aggressive stance on what information it is authorized to
report to the public and to whom information can be disclosed. Overall,
this process should lead to increased transparency in the results of
inspections and disciplinary actions. However, it remains to be seen how
the role of the SEC will affect disclosure by the Board, and if the Board's
authority to disclose general information regarding inspection results will
be challenged.
F. Discipline
Critical to the success of a regulator charged with investigating and
dealing with misconduct is a timely and effective system of discipline.
The disciplinary function of the past system of self-regulation was
carried out primarily by the PEEC and the QCIC. 149 The QCIC
investigated alleged improprieties against member firms related to audits
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 105(b)(4)(B), 116 Stat.
745, 760-61 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(4)(B)).
146. Id. § 105(d)(1).
147. Id. § 105(d)(2).
148. Id. § 105(c)(2).
149. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Report and Recommendations ch. 6.44, at
http://www.pobauditpanel.org/download.html (Aug. 31, 2000) [hereinafter POB Report
and Recommendations].
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of SEC clients,150 and the PEEC was responsible to investigate
improprieties of individual AICPA members' 5' and took cases on referral
from the QCIC. 52  However, as mentioned in Section III-B, out of
alleged "fairness," at the firm's request, the PEEC would automatically
defer investigation until any litigation or regulatory proceeding was
completed, often many years later. 53 This system resulted in long delays
in investigation and rendered the disciplinary function essentially
ineffective.1
54
In addition to being affected by the limitations already discussed in
this comment, the most significant sanction that could be levied by the
PEEC was revocation of AICPA membership. 155 While revocation of
AICPA membership would result in bad publicity for an accounting firm,
the firm would still be able to practice before the SEC without limitation.
Also critical to note is that the POB, responsible for overseeing the peer
review system as well as the other ethics investigations, never sanctioned
a major accounting firm during its twenty-five years in existence, even
when peer reviews uncovered significant deficiencies in a firm's audit
procedures. 56 The SEC and State boards of accountancy are also able to
impose sanctions, but they have been hampered by limited budgets and a
lack of effective means of investigating alleged misconduct., 57 All of
these limitations created public frustration with the system and created a
perception that the system of investigation and discipline was not
effective.1
58
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the new regulatory
scheme under the PCAOB is the unification of investigatory powers and
disciplinary powers' 59 within the same entity, along with a funding
150. Id. ch. 6.44.
151. Id.
152. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf
A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law).
153. Id.
154. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 799 (statement of Bevis Longstreth, Member
of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
155. See POB Report and Recommendations, supra note 149, ch. 6.49.
156. Jonathan Weil & Scot J. Paltrow, Peer Pressure: SEC Saw Accounting Flaw,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at C1.
157. POB Report and Recommendations, supra note 149, ch. 6.50.
158. Id. ch. 6.52.
159. The PCAOB has been given authority to impose significant sanctions when
malfeasance is discovered. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 105(c)(4), 116 Stat. 745, 762 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4)). These sanctions can
include revocation of a firm's registration, suspension or bar of a person from further
association with any registered firm, limitations on the operations of a firm, civil money
penalties, censure, required education or training, or "any other appropriate sanction"
provided for in Board rules. Id. § 105(c)(4)(A)-(G). In cases of intentional, knowing, or
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source that should be adequate to implement both. The vesting of such
complete authority within the PCAOB has the potential to alleviate
concerns raised in the past regarding the timeliness and effectiveness of
the disciplinary process. As the investigatory and disciplinary functions
are no longer fragmented and spread between multiple regulatory bodies,
the potential for swift response when malfeasance is discovered is much
greater. However, this will depend on other issues of efficiency in
organization internal to the PCAOB. For instance, in its rules, the Board
intended to observe certain "separation of functions" principles with
regard to its investigatory and disciplinary functions. 160  While such
principles are clearly in the interest of fairness in the disciplinary
process, it is unclear how this will affect the efficiency of the referral
process as well as the disciplinary process itself.
IV. Unanswered Questions
The scheme of inspection and investigation of accounting firms
promulgated by the Act should result in a number of marked
improvements over the prior regulatory scheme. However, there are still
some questions that remain unanswered, in addition to those previously
mentioned in this comment. The answers to these questions will bear
greatly on the ultimate success or failure of the PCAOB to achieve the
objectives of the Act. These questions are discussed below.
A. The "Culture of Gamesmanship"
While the PCAOB has been granted broad power to conduct an
effective scheme of inspection and investigation, the question arises as to
how aggressively it will make use of this power to pursue the practice of
earnings management. 161 This excessive zeal for earnings management
reckless conduct, or repeated instances of negligent conduct, monetary penalties can
reach $750,000 for an individual, or up to $15,000,000 for a firm. Id. § 105(c)(4)(D),
105(c)(5). In other cases where violations are found, the penalties can reach $100,000 for
an individual and $2 million for a firm. Id. § 105(c)(4)(D).
160. Staff from the PCAOB Division of Enforcement and Investigations are not
permitted to participate or advise in the decision, or in Board review of the decision, in
any disciplinary proceeding, except as witness or counsel. PCAOB Investigation Rules,
supra note 64, Rule 5100(c).
161. With increased pressure on companies to meet past or projected earnings levels,
some managers have engaged in manipulation, or "smoke and mirrors," to enhance their
companies' earnings and, in turn, the companies' share prices. Isaac C. Hunt, Jr.,
Accountants as Gatekeepers-Adding Security and Value to the Financial Reporting
System, Remarks Before the Federation of Schools of Accountancy, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch518.htm (Oct. 26, 2001). When such tactics are
discovered, the resulting restatements of earnings have caused investors to lose billions of
dollars and to lose confidence in the market. Id.
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has been characterized by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as a
"culture of gamesmanship."' 162 This is the culture that permits bending
the rules, tweaking the numbers, and letting obvious discrepancies
slide.1 63 This culture has impacted corporate auditors and makes auditors
more concerned with selling their services and keeping clients happy
than with actually finding discrepancies.164
It has been widely acknowledged that current auditing standards
allow for such earnings management practices.165 Former SEC Chief
Accountant, Lynn Turner, remarked that the standards are so general that
holding anyone accountable for not following them is difficult. 166 As
long as this is the case, it is likely that auditors will continue to attempt to
take advantage of standards that allow them to promote the drive of their
clients toward aggressive earnings management.
The PCAOB has the ability to react to the discovery of such
earnings management techniques in at least two ways. First, when the
PCAOB discovers the use and approval by the auditors of accounting
techniques that push the envelope of what is required under the
standards, it can take a conservative view of the intent of the standards
and require restatement, commence an investigation, and ultimately
impose sanctions on the offending firm. Second, the Board can choose
to take a more liberal stance on standards interpretation and find that as
long as the accounting practices at issue fall within the technical letter of
the standards, no remedial action will be taken.
The Board has flexibility in this area because of the way the current
standards are written. It is likely that the Board, in its future standard-
setting, will attempt to develop standards that are more focused on
protecting the interests of investors than on the interests of the auditors
and audit clients. In the meantime, it remains to be seen how the Board
will deal with these gray areas of accounting and auditing standards
application. It is in these gray areas that the ability of the PCAOB to
help implement a real improvement in auditor accountability will be
162. Senate Hearings L supra note 7, at 57 (Statement of Arthur Levitt, Former
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and
Transparency Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the House Comm. On Financial
Services, 107th Cong. 284 (2002) (statement of Lynn Turner, Former Chief Accountant,
Securities and Exchange Commission). The Act also gives the PCAOB the authority to
set accounting standards. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103, 116
Stat. 745, 755-57 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213). However, the ramifications of this
standard-setting authority, as well as the need for revisions in the standards are beyond
the scope of this comment.
166. David S. Hilzenrath, After Enron, New Doubts About Auditors, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 2001, at AOI.
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shown.
B. Frequency of Inspections
The aggressiveness of the PCAOB will also be revealed through the
frequency of its inspections. The Act provides that, at a minimum,
inspections will be conducted annually for the major accounting firms
and triennially for smaller firms.' 167 However, the Act also gives the
PCAOB the authority to modify this schedule, and to conduct special
inspections of its own volition.1 68 While conducting regular inspections
of the larger firms more often than on an annual basis seems implausible,
the idea that the Board would respond to specific requests by the SEC, or
to other specific allegations of wrongdoing, with a more timely
inspection, seems imperative. While this is partially a matter of funding,
much will depend on the will of the PCAOB to provide a timely response
to protest the interests of the investing public.
The Board, in its rulemaking process, stated that a majority vote of
the Board would be necessary to authorize a special inspection. 169 The
Board also declined to develop a set threshold or list of criteria that
would trigger a special inspection. 7 ° Thus, the Board has retained
maximum flexibility for itself as to when it will launch a special
inspection. As this authority has been held closely by the Board, the
Board has also retained complete responsibility for justifying the
decision whether or not to commence a special inspection. It remains to
be seen how the Board will administer this responsibility.
C. Appropriateness of Sanctions
The Board has at its discretion a wide variety of possible sanctions
that can be imposed in the event of a rules violation.1 71 The willingness
of the Board to impose the more severe sanctions will bear on the overall
success or failure of the Board to achieve the objectives of the Act.
Possible sanctions include revocation of a firm's registration, suspension
or bar of a person from association with a registered firm, limitation on
the activities, functions, or operations of such firm or person, civil money
penalties of up to $100,000 for an individual or $2 million for a firm,
censure, additional education or training, or any other appropriate
sanction provide for in Board rules. 172 In cases involving intentional,
167. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
168. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(b)(2).
169. PCAOB Release No. 2003-019, supra note 10, app. 2 at A2-4.
170. Id. at A2-4 to -5.
171. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(c)(4).
172. Id. § 104(c)(4)(A)-(G).
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knowing, or reckless violations, the money penalties can reach $750,000
for an individual and $15 million for a firm.
173
The most devastating sanction that the PCAOB could impose on a
major accounting firm is a revocation of that firm's registration,
temporary or permanent. Revocation of registration would prohibit that
firm from participating in preparation or issuance of the audit report of
any issuer, 174 and would sound the death knell for that firm's reputation
and practice. It is unlikely that this sanction will be imposed except in
the most serious of circumstances. However, after the fate of Arthur
Anderson in the wake of the Enron disaster, firms must respect the
possibility that such a sanction could be imposed. The otherwise broad
array of options for sanction possessed by the PCAOB leaves open the
question of how effective the process of PCAOB discipline will be.
D. Violations of Accounting Standards
The Act charges the PCAOB with identifying violations of
"professional standards" by registered accounting firms through its
process of inspections. 75 The Board, in its rules, defined "professional
standards" to include, in addition to auditing and quality control
standards, accounting principles under the securities laws. 176  This
presents a question as to whether accounting firms will now be
responsible for any and every violation of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles on the part of the issuers whose audits they
perform.
The development of sound accounting policies and the preparation
of financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") are responsibilities of the management
173. Id. § 104(c)(5).
174. Id. § 102(a).
175. Id. § 104(c)(1).
176. The term "professional standards" means-(A) accounting principles that
are-(i) established by the standard setting body described in section 19(b) of
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended by the Act, or prescribed by the
Commission under section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 or section 13(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (ii) relevant to audit reports for
particular issuers, or dealt with in the quality control system of a particular
registered public accounting firm; and (B) auditing standards, standards for
attestation engagements, quality control policies and procedures, ethical and
competency standards, and independence standards (including rules
implementing Title II of the Act) that the Board or the Commission
determines-(i) relate to the preparation or issuance of audit reports for issuers;
and (ii) are established or adopted by the Board under section 103(a) of the Act,
or are promulgated as rules of the Commission.
PCAOB Inspection Rules, supra note 63, Rule 1001(p)(vi).
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of the audit client. 177 The auditors are responsible to perform and audit
in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
("GAAS"). 78 These standards are designed to ensure that the auditor
performs the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial
statements are free from material misstatement.1 79  As such, certain
technical violations of GAAP may be overlooked or not corrected by the
auditor, if they are deemed immaterial.
The Board rules, which include accounting principles in the
definition of professional standards, could thereby effectively broaden
the scope of conduct for which an accounting firm may be held
responsible and thereby subject to Board investigation or discipline. A
technical violation of GAAP in the financial statements of an issuer may
not necessarily give rise to a violation of GAAS by the auditor.
However, since the Board can investigate and discipline a firm for a
violation of professional standards, which includes a violation of
accounting standards, a firm may, under Board rules, presumably be
investigated and disciplined even though the firm conducted the audit in
accordance with GAAS. Much of whether this distinction creates
controversy in the future will depend on the desire of the Board to pursue
investigation of such accounting principles violations.
E. Communication with State Boards ofAccountancy
The Act provides that in many instances the PCAOB has discretion
as to whether or not, and to what extent, it will disclose to the State
boards of accountancy conduct on the part of auditors that it determines
violates applicable rules. 80 The question then arises whether or not the
PCAOB will exercise that discretion to consistently communicate
wrongful acts or rules violations to the State boards of accountancy. As
the applicable State board of accountancy is the only regulatory body
that can revoke the license of an accounting firm or an individual, this
communication appears necessary to protect the interests of the investing
177. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1, § 110.03 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
178. Id. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 95, § 150.01 (American Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2001).
179. Id. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 110.02 (American Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
180. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(c)(2) (charging the Board with reporting
violations of the Act, Board rules, SEC rules, the firm's quality control policies, or
professional standards, to State regulatory authorities "if appropriate,"); see also id.
§ 104(g)(1) (charging the Board with transmitting to State regulatory authorities, "in
appropriate detail," the Board's inspection reports); see also id. § 105(b)(5)(B)
(permitting information gained as part of a Board investigation to be made available "in
the discretion of the Board" to appropriate State regulatory authorities).
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public, especially as it relates to the audits of non-issuers, over whom the
PCAOB has no disciplinary authority.
There are opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of the
communication between the SROs and the State boards of accountancy
in resolving issues of audit failure.1 81 The POB believed that one of its
major functions was to facilitate that communication.' 82 As such, the
POB intended to serve as a unifying oversight body to promote
communication between the other regulatory bodies, including the State
boards, and to provide leadership.1 83  The PCAOB now has the
opportunity to provide that leadership in the regulatory structure. The
State boards are so resource-constrained that they have rarely been able
to take disciplinary action.1 84 Thus, communication of information by
the PCAOB regarding malfeasance on the part of accountants becomes a
crucial head start for State board enforcement action.
In its rulemaking process, the PCAOB expressly retained its
flexibility to determine when, and to what extent, it will disclose
information to the State boards of accountancy. The language in the
PCAOB rule on the reporting of violations to the State boards essentially
tracks the language of the Act, permitting PCAOB referral "if [the
PCAOB] determines appropriate.' 85 In drafting this rule, the PCAOB
expressly considered the possibility that it would in some instances
report violations to the SEC, but not to the applicable State board of
accountancy. 86 Thus, it appears the PCAOB does not intend to create,
by default, an open channel of communication between itself and the
State boards of accountancy. As such, only time will tell if the PCAOB
will help the State boards in their disciplinary processes by passing on
information regarding malfeasance discovered during PCAOB
inspections or investigations.
V. Conclusion
Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and creation of the
PCAOB, the system of self-regulation in the accounting profession did
not include an effective mechanism of investigating and disciplining
misconduct and rules violations by accounting firms. Regulatory
181. Senate Hearings II, supra note 4, at 557 (statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the U.S.).
182. Id. at 984 (The Road to Reform, A White Paper from the Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a New Private Sector Regulatory Structure for the Accounting
Profession, March 19, 2002).
183. Id.
184. Senate Hearings I, supra note 7, at 225 (statement of Lynn Turner, Former Chief
Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission).
185. PCAOB Inspection Rules, supra note 63, Rule 4004.
186. PCAOB Release No. 2003-019, supra note 110, app. 2 at A2-9 to -10.
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organizations were hampered by insufficient resources and a lack of real
authority and real independence. The Enron debacle finally spurred
Congress to act on concerns about the effectiveness of the system that
had long since existed.
The system of inspection and investigation established by the Act to
be administered by the PCAOB should result in significant
improvements upon the pre-Act regulatory system. The ultimate success
or failure of the PCAOB to regain investor confidence and restore
accountability will now depend largely on the Board's diligence in
responding to the "culture of gamesmanship." With the creation of the
PCAOB, the regulatory organization charged with overseeing the
accounting profession now has the resources and the statutory authority
to implement an effective system of regulatory inspections,
investigations, and discipline. The authority given to the PCAOB should
allow the Board to fulfill the objectives of the Act and create increased
investor confidence through improved accountability in the accounting
profession.
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